The focus of this paper is on developing veri…able su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of betterreply security might be advantageous when the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is concerned. Then, we study equilibrium existence in better-reply secure games possessing a payo¤ secure mixed extension. With the aid of an example, we show that such games need not have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We provide geometric conditions for the mixed extension of a two-person game that is reciprocally upper semicontinuous and uniformly payo¤ secure to be better-reply secure.
Introduction
Nowadays, one of the main tools in the arsenal of economists concerned with equilibrium existence is Reny's (1999) theorem, according to which a compact Borel game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if its mixed extension is better-reply secure.
2 In applications, better-reply security usually follows from two conditions: one related to reciprocal upper semicontinuity and the other to payo¤ security. Establishing the payo¤ security of a game's mixed extension often constitutes a complicated problem. The concept of uniform payo¤ security, introduced by Monteiro and Page (2007) , makes the problem considerably more tractable in games where it is applicable, including catalog games (Page and Monteiro, 2003) and voting models (Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok, 2007) . 3 Verifying whether a game that is not upper semicontinuous-sum has a betterreply secure mixed extension is, as a rule, quite challenging. This paper's main focus is on studying the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in normal form games where the sum of the payo¤ functions is not necessarily upper semicontinuous.
We begin with considering the games having a diagonally transfer continuous mixed extension, appealing to the analogy with the better-reply secure mixed extensions. Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) showed that the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in diagonally transfer continuous games follows from a generalization of the Knuster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) lemma. 4 In Section 2 of this paper, the Ky Fan minimax inequality, in a slightly generalized form, is used to prove that every compact Borel game 2 A number of results extending Reny's equilibrium existence theorem have been obtained recently (see, e.g., Barelli and Meneghel, 2013; Bich, 2009; Carmona, 2011; de Castro, 2011; McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky, 2011; Reny, 2013) 3 Another approach to showing the payo¤ security of mixed extensions can be found in Duggan (2007) , where hospitable strategies are used for studying equilibrium existence in voting models. 4 The …rst part of this paper contains a number of results …rst presented in our 2012 working paper "On Uniform Conditions for the Existence of Mixed Strategy Equilibria." whose mixed extension is diagonally transfer continuous has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The range of applications of this basic result is considerably broader than that of Glicksberg's (1952) equilibrium existence theorem -whose proof is based on the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg …xed point theorem. In particular, the mixed extension of a game is diagonally transfer continuous if the following two conventional assumptions hold: the extension is payo¤ secure and the game is upper semicontinuous-sum. Then, in Section 3, we extend the concept of uniform payo¤ security to diagonally transfer continuous games by introducing uniform diagonal security. In the upper semicontinuous-sum games, uniform payo¤ security implies uniform diagonal security. At the same time, if a compact Borel game is uniformly diagonally secure, it has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which makes it possible to avoid having to study any additional properties of the game's mixed extension.
Example 1 is a slight modi…cation of the Tullock rent-seeking game where it is additionally assumed that the favor the players vie for is granted to a third party with probability one-half if at least one player exerts no e¤ort at all. Notwithstanding the fact that the game is not better-reply secure, it is not only diagonally transfer continuous, but also uniformly diagonally secure; that is, the game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4, we adapt Simon's (1987) concept of weak domination on average to our setting by introducing weak uniform payo¤ security, a generalization of uniform payo¤ security. Using this concept, we construct a better-reply secure two-person game with a payo¤ secure mixed extension that has no mixed strategy equilibria (Example 2).
In Section 5, we study the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in reciprocally upper semicontinuous games that are uniformly payo¤ secure. In such games, the equilibrium existence problem becomes considerably more tractable if it is possible to transform the game into an upper semicontinuous-sum game with the aid of positive a¢ ne transformations, 5 which, in particular, implies that the game also has a reciprocally upper semicontinuous mixed extension. In Example 3, this technique is applied to a conventional two-candidate probabilistic spatial voting game. Theorems 5 and 6 give geometric su¢ cient conditions for games that are reciprocally upper semicontinuous and uniformly payo¤ secure to have a better-reply secure mixed extension.
The Appendix contains a number of auxiliary results, deferred proofs, and some comments regarding Theorem 5b of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) .
The Model and Some Facts
We consider a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , where I = f1; : : : ; ng, each player i's pure strategy set X i is a nonempty, compact subset of a metrizable topological vector space, and each payo¤ function u i is a bounded Borel measurable function from the Cartesian product X = i2I X i , equipped with the product topology, to R. Under these conditions, G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is called a compact Borel game. A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is quasiconcave if each X i is convex and u i ( ; x i ) : X i ! R is quasiconcave for all i 2 I and all x i 2 X i , where X i = k2Infig X k . In this paper, by a game we mean a compact Borel game.
The following de…nition of a payo¤ secure game is due to Reny (1999) .
i in some open neighborhood of x i . The game G is payo¤ secure if for every x 2 X and every " > 0, each player i can secure a payo¤ of u i (x) " at x.
Payo¤ security can be reformulated in terms of transfer lower semicontinuity, due to Tian (1992).
De…nition 2 Let Z and Y be two topological spaces. A function f : Z Y ! R is -transfer lower semicontinuous in y if for every (z; y) 2 Z Y , f (z; y) > implies that there exists some point z 0 2 Z and some neighborhood
f : Z Y ! R is transfer lower semicontinuous in y if f is -transfer lower semicontinuous in y for every 2 R.
A game is payo¤ secure if and only if each player's payo¤ function is transfer lower semicontinuous in the other players' strategies (see Prokopovych, 2011, Lemma 1) .
The graph of G is de…ned by GrG = f(x; u) 2 X R n j u i (x) = u i for all i 2 N g, and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of G in X is denoted by E G . For a subset B of a topological vector space X, we denote by clB the closure of B and by coB the convex hull of B. In a metric space Y , we denote by B Y (y; r) the open ball centered at y and with radius r > 0.
De…nition 3 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is better-reply secure if whenever (x ; u ) 2 clGrG and x 2 XnE G , some player i can secure a payo¤ strictly above u i at x .
A useful fact is that a payo¤ secure game is better-reply secure i¤ it is also transfer reciprocally upper semicontinuous (see Bagh and Jofre, 2006; Prokopovych, 2011, Lemma 2) .
De…nition 4 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is: (i) reciprocally upper semicontinuous if for any (x; ) 2 clGrGnGrG, there is a player i such that u i (x) > i ; (ii) weakly reciprocally upper semicontinuous if whenever (x; ) 2 clGrGnGrG, there are a player i and d i 2 X i such that u i (d i ; x i ) > i ; (iii) transfer reciprocally upper semicontinuous if whenever (x; ) 2 clGrGnGrG and x is not a Nash equilibrium, there are a player i and
It is clear that every weakly reciprocally upper semicontinuous game is transfer reciprocally upper semicontinuous. Reny's (1999) equilibrium existence theorem states that every compact, quasiconcave, better-reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Theorem 1 (Reny,1999 ) If G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is compact, quasiconcave, and better-reply secure, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Another approach to studying equilibrium existence in discontinuous games, based on the concept of diagonal transfer continuity, due to Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) .
For G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , de…ne the following aggregator functions:
where, as usual, the i subscript on x stands for "all players except i,"
and
A strategy pro…le x 2 X is a Nash equilibrium of G i¤
De…nition 5 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is diagonally transfer continuous if for every x 2 XnE G , there exist some d 2 X and some neighborhood
It is worth noticing that G is diagonally transfer continuous i¤ F G is 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in x.
Every payo¤ secure game with an upper semicontinuous A 0 G is diagonally transfer continuous.
Lemma 1 If, in a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , each u i : X ! R is transfer lower semicontinuous in x i and the aggregator function A 0 G : X ! R is upper semicontinuous, then G is diagonally transfer continuous.
For convenience, the proof of Lemma 1 is given in the Appendix. Now we de…ne the mixed extension (G) of a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I . Denote by 4(X i ) the set of Borel probability measures on X i and by ca(X i ) the set of Borel signed measures with …nite total variation on X i . A basic open neighborhood of i 2 ca(X i ) in the weak topology on ca(X i ) is a set of the form i 2 ca(X i ) :
; j = 1; : : : ; m for some continuous f j : X i ! R, j = 1; : : : ; m, and " > 0. The set ca(X i ) is a Hausdor¤ topological vector space equipped with the weak topology. The topology induced on 4(X i ) by the weak topology is compact. 6 Let each of the Cartesian products ca(X) = ca(X 1 ) : : : ca(X n ) and 4(X) = 4(X 1 ) : : : 4(X n ) be equipped with the product topology. The set ca(X) is a Hausdor¤ topological vector space in which the operations of addition and scalar multiplication are de…ned as follows: for = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 ca(X) and 2 R the scalar multiplication of by is the element given by = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ). The addition of = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 ca(X) and v = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 ca(X) gives
The mixed extension of the game G is the n-player normal form game
, where 4(X i ) is player i's strategy set and player i's payo¤ function U i : 4(X) ! R is de…ned by
: : :
For the game (G), we also de…ne the aggregator functions A (G) :
6 In order to make 4(X i ) a subset of a linear space, we embed it in the space ca(X i ) of signed measures with …nite total variation on X i . Sometimes it is possible to proceed without the embedding. See, for example, the proof of the compactness of the set of probability measures given by Glycopantis and Muir (2004) .
: 4(X) ! R, and F (G) : 4(X) 4(X) ! R (see the corresponding de…nitions for G).
Theorem 2 If the mixed extension (G) of a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is diagonally transfer continuous, then G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The set 4(X) is a compact, convex subset of ca(X). Consider the aggregator function F (G) ( ; ) : 4(X) 4(X) ! R. Since F (G) is linear in and 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in , the mixed extension (G) of G has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies by the Ky Fan minimax inequality (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix).
Another proof of Theorem 2 can be obtained by using the fact that every diagonally transfer continuous mixed extension has the single deviation property (see, for some details, Reny, , 2011 and Prokopovych, 2013) .
Since the upper semicontinuity of A 0 G implies the upper semicontinuity of A 0 (G) , verifying whether a game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium usually means verifying the following two properties: (a) the upper semicontinuity of the sum of the payo¤ functions; and (b) the payo¤ security of its mixed extension. If these properties hold, the mixed extension of the game is not only better-reply secure but, by Lemma 1, diagonally transfer continuous. For example, this is the case for the all-pay auction games with homogeneous valuations (see Baye, Kovenock, and Vries, 1996; Monteiro and Page, 2007) . It is also clear that every game whose payo¤ functions are continuous has a diagonally transfer continuous mixed extension since the mixed extension itself is a continuous game (see, e.g., Aliprantis, Glycopantis, and Puzzello, 2006) .
The diagonal transfer continuity of a game does not imply that its mixed extension is diagonally transfer continuous. For example, Sion and Wolfe's (1957) zero-sum game is payo¤ secure (see Carmona, 2005) and its aggregator function A 0 G is constant. Thus, the game is diagonally transfer continuous by Lemma 1. However, since the game has no mixed strategy Nash equilibria, its mixed extension is not diagonally transfer continuous.
Uniform Diagonal Security
An easily veri…able condition for the mixed extension of a game to be payo¤ secure is that of uniform payo¤ security, due to Monteiro and Page (2007) .
De…nition 6 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly payo¤ secure if for each i 2 I, every x i 2 X i and every
We will omit the arguments x i and " of d i if there is no ambiguity. Another useful de…nition is the following: In G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , player i's payo¤ function u i : X i X i ! R is said to be uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in x i at x i 2 X i if for every " > 0, there is d i 2 X i such that, for every
The mixed extension of a uniformly payo¤ secure, upper semicontinuoussum game is both better-reply secure and diagonally transfer continuous.
Corollary 1 If G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly payo¤ secure and its aggregator function A 0 G is upper semicontinuous, then the mixed extension (G) is diagonally transfer continuous, and, therefore, G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The notion of a uniformly payo¤ secure game can be extended to diagonally transfer continuous games.
De…nition 7 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly diagonally secure if for every d 2 X and every " > 0, there is d 2 X such that for every x 2 X,
An upper semicontinuous-sum game G is uniformly diagonally secure if it is uniformly payo¤ secure.
Lemma 2 If a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly payo¤ secure and the aggregator function A 0 G : X ! R is upper semicontinuous, then G is uniformly diagonally secure.
Proof. Fix d 2 X and " > 0. By the uniform payo¤ security of G, for each i 2 I, there is a deviation strategy d i 2 X i such that, for every
Theorem 3 If a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is uniformly diagonally secure, then its mixed extension (G) is diagonally transfer continuous, and, therefore, G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3 follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 1 of Monteiro and Page (2007) and is given in the Appendix.
The concept of uniform diagonal security might be of help in studying equilibirum existence in games whose aggregator function A 0 G is not upper semicontinuous.
Example 1 Consider a slight modi…cation of the rent-seeking game due to Tullock (1980) . Two players simultaneously bid for a political favor commonly known worth V dollars. Their bids, denoted by x 1 and x 2 , in ‡uence the probability of receiving the favor. Player i's strategy set is the segment [0; V ]. Let i (x 1 ; x 2 ) denote the probability that player i wins. The function i , called player i's contest success function, is speci…ed as follows:
where r > 0. Player i's payo¤ function u i is
The only di¤erence of the model from the Tullock rent-seeking game is the assumption that if the lowest bid submitted is equal to zero (or, in other words, at least one player exerts no e¤ort at all), the favor may be granted to a third party with probability one-half. Consequently, the aggregator function A 0 G is not upper semicontinuous. Let, for speci…city, V = 2 and r = 3. In this case, the game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria (see, for a related discussion, Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1994) . For example, one can check that the only candidate point for being an interior solution is (1:5; 1:5), a strategy pro…le where both players get negative expected payo¤s. However, each of them can avoid getting a negative payo¤ by bidding zero.
To verify that the game is not better-reply secure, consider the sequence
) for k = 1; 2; : : : :Then the corresponding sequence of payo¤ vectors f(u 1 (x k ); u 2 (x k ))g converges to (1; 1). It is clear that no player can secure a payo¤ strictly above 1 at (0; 0). On the other hand, the game possesses mixed strategy equilibria since it is uniformly diagonally secure. To verify this, for d 2 X and " 2 (0; 1), de…ne
It is a little tedious but not di¢ cult to show that, for every
Weak Uniform Payo¤ Security
The Sion-Wolfe (1957) game is a better-reply secure game that has no Nash equilibria. Its mixed extension is upper semicontinuous-sum, but is not payo¤ secure (see Carmona, 2005, Example 3) . From now on, we study equilibrium existence in games whose mixed extension is payo¤ secure. Example 2 shows that there are better-reply secure games with a payo¤ secure mixed extension which have no Nash equilibria. The following de…nition extends Simon's (1987, p. 577 ) concept of weak domination on average to our setting.
De…nition 8 In G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , player i's payo¤ function u i is weakly uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in the other players' strategies at x i 2 X i if for every i 2 4(X i ) and every " > 0, there are a strategy i (x i ; i ; ") 2 4(X i ) and a Borel set
The game G is weakly uniformly payo¤ secure if each u i is weakly uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in the other players'strategies at every x i 2 X i .
There is some notational abuse in denoting
by U i ( i (x i ; i ; "); w i ), but no ambiguity ensues. The proof of the next statement follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 3 of Simon (1987) and is relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 3 If a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is weakly uniformly payo¤ secure, then its mixed extension (G) is payo¤ secure.
The game studied in Example 2 is not only better-reply secure but also has a payo¤ secure mixed extension. However it does not possess mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
Example 2 Let I = f1; 2g, X = [0; 1] [0; 1], and the payo¤ functions are de…ned by
Let us show that the game has no mixed strategy Nash equilibria. It is clear that there is no Nash equilibrium (b 1 ; b 2 ) with b 2 (f1g) = 1.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that (b 1 ; b 2 ) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
If
x 2 g must be a null set with respect to the product measure b = b 1 b 2 , otherwise, by choosing strategy 1 with probability 1, player 1 can increase her payo¤. Then, in the equilibrium, the payo¤ to player 2 is equal to 1. However, player 2 can guarantee herself at least 0 by choosing strategy 1 with probability 1, a contradiction. Therefore, b 2 (f1g) > 0. Then it must also be the case that b 1 ( ( 1 2 ; 1)) = 0.
g must be a null set with respect to the product measure b , otherwise player 2 can increase her payo¤ by shifting some weight from [0;
. The set
g is also a null set, otherwise player 1 could bene…t from shifting some weight from (0; 1 2 ) closer to 0 (recall that, on D 2 , u 1 ( ; x 2 ) is a strictly decreasing function for any x 2 2 (0; 1)). Furthermore, the set D 3 = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 X : x 1 + 1 2 < x 2 < 1; x 1 6 = 0g is a null set, otherwise player 2 can increase her payo¤ by shifting some weight from (
is a null set implies that b 2 ([0; 1)) = 0, which is impossible since there is no Nash equilibrium with
1 2 ]) > 0, then b 1 (f0g) = 0, otherwise player 1 can increase her payo¤ by shifting the mass b 1 (f0g) to strategy 1 (recall that u 1 (0; 1) = 0). Further, player 2 can increase her payo¤ by shifting the mass b 2 ([0;
1 2 ]) to strategy 1 if b 1 (f1g) > 0, and, for example, to
; 1]) = 1), and again player 2 can get a nonnegative payo¤ by playing 1 with probability 1. Thus, b 2 (f1g) = 1, a contradiction.
We will now show, for completeness, that u 1 is weakly uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in player 2's strategies at every x 1 2 X 1 . Denote by
the Dirac measure concentrated at x 1 . One can see that the payo¤ function u 1 is uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in player 2's strategies at any
; 1], with 1 (x 1 ; 2 ; ") = D 1 for every 2 2 4(X 2 ), and every " > 0. Fix some x 1 2 (0; 1 2 ), 2 2 4(X 2 ), and " > 0. It is not di¢ cult to see that there is " 0 2 (0; ") such that both x 1 " 0 and x 1 + " 0 lie in the interval
2 ) " for every x 2 2 Q 2 and all w 2 in some open neighborhood N X 2 (x 2 ) of x 2 in X 2 . A similar reasoning can be used to show that u 2 is weakly uniformly transfer lower semicontinuous in player 1's strategies at every x 2 2 X 2 .
Equilibria of Reciprocally Upper Semicontinuous Games with Payo¤ Secure Mixed Extensions
Verifying whether a game is transfer reciprocally upper semicontinuous is often considerably easier than doing that for its mixed extension. In this section, we study several classes of better-reply secure games with payo¤ secure mixed extensions that also have transfer reciprocally upper semicontinuous mixed extensions.
Some reciprocally upper semicontinuous games can be transformed into upper semicontinuous-sum games with the aid of positive a¢ ne transformations. If this is the case, the game has a reciprocally upper semicontinuous mixed extension. Example 3 demonstrates that a conventional probabilistic spatial voting model possesses this property.
Then we study equilibrium existence in reciprocally upper semicontinuous games of two players on the unit square that have a payo¤ secure mixed extension . Additional conditions are made on the set of discontinuities of the payo¤ functions. In particular, it is assumed that the discontinuities lie on one or two strictly monotone, continuous curves.
We now introduce some notation. Recall that a function : R ! R is a positive a¢ ne transformation if it can be written in the form: (x) = ax + b where a > 0 and b is any real number. Given a game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I and an n-tuple of positive a¢ ne transformations ( 1 ; : : : ; n ), we denote by (G) the game (X i ; i (u i )) i2I . The following three facts are straightforward.
(i) Let G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , and let ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) be an n-tuple of positive a¢ ne transformations. Then E (G) = E ( (G)) .
(ii) Let ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) be an n-tuple of positive a¢ ne transformations. Then G = (X i ; u i ) i2N is weakly uniformly payo¤ secure i¤ the game (G) is weakly uniformly payo¤ secure.
(iii) Let ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) be an n-tuple of positive a¢ ne transformations. Then G = (X i ; u i ) i2N is reciprocally upper semicontinuous i¤ the game (G) is reciprocally upper semicontinuous.
Theorem 4 If G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is weakly uniformly payo¤ secure, and there is an n-tuple of positive a¢ ne transformations ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) such that the game (G) is upper semicontinuous-sum, then G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since G is weakly uniformly payo¤ secure, the game (G) is also weakly uniformly payo¤ secure by fact (ii). Thus, ( (G)) is payo¤ secure by Lemma 3.
The fact that (G) is upper semicontinuous-sum implies that ( (G)) is upper semicontinuous-sum. Since ( (G)) is the same game as ( (G)), the mixed extension (G) is reciprocally upper semicontinuous by fact (iii). By Theorem 1, (G) possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Example 3 Consider the following spatial voting model (see Ball, 1999 , Example 1). Two candidates are competing in an election for public of…ce. The electorate is distributed uniformly along the ideological spectrum [0; 1]. During the electoral campaign, each candidate i announces, simultaneously with the other candidate, a platform, denoted by x i . The probability P i (x i ; x i ) that candidate i wins the election is de…ned as follows:
for 0 x i < x i 1:
Candidates 1 and 2's policy preferences on [0; 1] are represented by h 1 (z) = 1 2 (z 1) 2 and h 2 (z) = 1 2 z 2 . The candidates are assumed to be o¢ cemotivated. Let the candidates'o¢ ce motivation parameters be k 1 = :05 and k 2 = 3, respectively. Candidate i's payo¤ function is
The game is not upper semicontinuous-sum and has no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Now we consider the game (G) = (X i ; i (u i )) i2f1;2g where 1 and 2 are de…ned by 1 (t) = k 2 k 1 t and 2 (t) = t for t 2 R, respectively. It is not di¢ cult to see that A 0 (G) is a continuous function on X. Since G is uniformly payo¤ secure, G possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium by Theorem 4.
It is useful to notice that the voting game is an example of a game with a better-reply secure mixed extension that is not upper semicontinuous-sum.
In the next two theorems, we study the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in some basic better-reply secure games of two players. To start with, we consider the case when all discontinuities of the payo¤ functions lie on a strictly monotonic, continuous curve. Denote 
R.
Then G has a better-reply secure mixed extension, and, therefore, it has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Condition (ii) is stronger than the assumption that all points of discontinuity of the payo¤ functions lie on S. In particular, (ii) implies that
verges to x 2 S; that is, the limit value does not depend on the choice of a sequence in S j . Condition (iii) may be replaced, if needed, with a number of other conditions, such as: (iii') for every " > 0 and each z 2 f0; 1g, there exists a deviation strategy d 1 (z; ") satisfying the uniform payo¤ security condition for player 1's strategy z that is di¤erent from z; or (iii") u 2 (0; 0) f 1 2 (0; 0) and u 2 (1; 1) f 2 2 (1; 1). Theorem 5 can be extended to a class of games where the discontinuities of the payo¤ functions might lie on two strictly monotone, disjoint curves. In particular, Theorem 6 covers the games where one of the curves is strictly increasing and the other is strictly decreasing. 8 We will show it for a representative game from this class. For every h :
Theorem 6 Let G = (X i ; u i ) i2f1;2g be a two-player game on the unit square . Suppose that (i) G is uniformly payo¤ secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous; (ii) for each i 2 f1; 2g, there are continuous functions f
, and u i (x) = f 3 i (x) for every x 2 X 2 h 2 ; (iii) u 1 (1; 1) f 1 1 (1; 1) and u 1 (1; 0) f 3 1 (1; 0); (iv) for each i 2 f1; 2g and each l 2 f1; 2g, the restriction of u i to X h l , u i jX h l , is a continuous function from X h l to R. Then G has a better-reply secure mixed extension, and, therefore, it has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Condition (iii) of Theorem 6 may be replaced with a number of other 8 Equilibrium existence conditions similar to those presented in Theorem 6 can also be provided for Sion-Wolfe-type games. geometric conditions, if need appears.
Example 4 Consider the following deterministic spatial voting model. Two candidates are competing in an election for public o¢ ce. The electorate is distributed uniformly along the ideological spectrum [0; 1]. The candidate with the most votes wins. Each voter casts his vote for the candidate that is closest to her ideological position. During the electoral campaign, each candidate i announces, simultaneously with the other candidate, a platform x i 2 [0; 1] to which he commits if elected. The probability that candidate i wins the election is
The inequality (x i + x i 1)(x i x i ) > 0 represents the fact that candidate i gets most of the votes. For example, if x i > x i and
, then 
Thus, each candidate cares only about winning, and taking an ideological position di¤erent from her ideal point is costly. It is not di¢ cult to see that the game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Both Theorem 4 and Theorem 6 can be used to prove the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in this game, notwithstanding the fact that the discontinuities of the payo¤ functions lie on both of the diagonals of the unit square. We now show how to apply Theorem 6 to this game. First notice that every pure strategy z 2 [0; ) of player 1 is strictly dominated by strategy 1.
As a result, to show that the game under study has mixed strategy equilibria, it is enough to investigate whether its restriction G r to [ One can see that G r is uniformly payo¤ secure. For example, given " > 0,
, then for every x 2 2 [0; 1] there exists an open neighborhood N X 2 (x 2 ) such that u 1 (1; w 2 ) > u 1 ( 3 5 ; x 2 ) " for all w 2 2 N X 2 (x 2 ). If x 1 2 ( 3 5
; 1], then there is 2 (0; x 1 3 5 ) such that for every x 2 2 [0; 1], u 1 (x 1 ; w 2 ) > u 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) " for all w 2 in some neighborhood N X 2 (x 2 ) of x 2 . Clearly, the game is reciprocally upper semicontinuous. The existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in G r follows from Theorem 6.
Conclusions
We use aggregator functions in conjunction with the Ky Fan minimax inequality to study the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in diagonally transfer continuous games. Similar to the approach based on the concept of better-reply security, the aggregation-based approach is applicable to the upper semicontinuous-sum games whose mixed extension is payo¤ secure. However, if the sum of a game's payo¤ functions of a game is not upper semicontinuous, showing that its mixed extension is either better-reply secure or diagonally transfer continuous often constitutes an intractable problem. To alleviate it, the concept of uniform payo¤ security is extended to diagonally transfer continuous games by introducing uniform diagonal security. We show that every uniformly diagonally secure game possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and, with the aid of an example, that uniformly diagonally secure games need not be better-reply secure.
After introducing a generalization of uniform payo¤ security, called weak uniform payo¤ security, we provide an example of a better-reply secure game with a payo¤ secure mixed extension that has no mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Then we study the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games that are reciprocally upper semicontinuous and uniformly payo¤ secure. We propose two sets of easily veri…able, geometric conditions for a better-reply secure game of two players to possess a better-reply secure mixed extension.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
We shall …rst show that A G (d; x) is transfer lower semicontinuous in x. Let 
G is upper semicontinuous on X, the transfer lower semicontinuity of A G in x implies the transfer lower semicontinuity of F G in x. In particular, F G is 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in x.
The Ky Fan Minimax Inequality
In Theorem 2, the Ky Fan minimax inequality is used in the following, slightly generalized form. (see, e.g., Tian, 1992; Ding and Park, 2002; Lan and Wu, 2002 , for more general results).
Lemma 4 Let X be a compact convex set in a Hausdor¤ topological vector space, and let f : X X R satisfy: (i) f (x; x) 0 for each x 2 X; (i) f ( ; y) is quasiconcave for each y 2 X, (ii) f is 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in y. Then there exists y 2 X such that f (x; y) 0 for all x 2 X.
Lemma 4 can be shown in a number of ways. Its conventional proofs are based either on the KKM lemma or on Browder's …xed point theorem, which are two equivalent results (see, for an in-depth discussion, Yannelis, 1991) . Let us give an outline of the proof using Browder's …xed point theorem. It proceeds by assuming, to the contrary, that, for each y 2 X, there exists x 2 X such that f (x; y) > 0. Then the correspondence M : X X de…ned by M (y) = fx 2 X : f (x; y) > 0g has nonempty values. The quasiconcavity of f in x implies that M has convex values. Since f is 0-transfer lower semicontinuous in y, M has a multivalued selection with open lower sections (see, e.g., Prokopovych, 2011) , denoted by M 0 : X X. Then, by Lemma 5.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) , the convex-valued correspondence M 0 : X X de…ned by M 0 (x) = coM 0 (x) also has open lower sections. Therefore, by Browder's …xed point theorem, the selection has a …xed point, which contradicts (i).
Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 4(X)nE (G) . Then there exists 2 4(X) such that F (G) ( ; ) > 0. Since is a vector of probability measures, there exists
) is the vector of Dirac measures concentrated at d 1 ; : : : ; d n , respectively. With some abuse of notation, we will write
The lower semicontinuity of F G in x implies that F (G) (d; ) : 4(X) ! R is lower semicontinuous (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 15.5) . Consequently,
means that (G) is diagonally transfer continuous.
Proof of Lemma 3
Fix some = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) 2 4(X), " > 0, and i 2 I. We have to show that, for each i 2 I, there are a strategy i 2 4(X i ) and a neighborhood
for every x i 2 Q i . For the brevity of notation, denote
); x i )d i is lower semicontinuous in the second argument (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 15.5) 
Some Comments on Theorem 5b of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) It is di¢ cult to overestimate the in ‡uence of Theorem 5b of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) on the subsequent development of equilibrium existence theory. As was pointed out by Bagh (2010) , the proof of Theorem 5b requires stronger assumptions than those made initially by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . In what follows we show that the modi…cations needed are almost impalpable. Consider a two-player game G = (X i ; u i ) i2f1;2g on the unit square, X = 
for all x 2 S j and all i; j 2 f1; 2g;
(ii) for each i 2 f1; 2g and every x 2 S, there exists j 2 f1; 2g such that
(iii) for every point x = (z; z) 2 S D , there exist i; j 2 f1; 2g such that
Then G has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
One can check that (i) and (ii) imply that both the initial game and the auxiliary game constructed in the proof are uniformly payo¤ secure. Condition (iii) is slightly stronger than the assumption that for every point
The di¤erence between them pertains to the points (0; 0) and (1; 1) only. The strengthening is needed to make it impossible for an equilibrium product measure of the modi…ed game to have mass points at (0; 0) or (1; 1).
The proof follows the general lines of Theorem 5b of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . First we will modify payo¤s on S D so as to make the sum of the payo¤ functions upper semicontinuous on X. However, at every x 2 S D we will modify only one player's payo¤, without changing the other player's payo¤. It is possible because if x 2 S D , then, for some
; that is, in the modi…ed game, the equality
for some j 2 f1; 2g, then put j(x) = j, and, if
De…ne the modi…ed payo¤ functions as follows: for any x 2 XnS D ;
Let us show, for example, that b u 1 is Borel measurable on X. Denote
The set S 1D , in its turn, consists of the following three subsets:
Thus, S 1D is a Borel set, which, in particular, implies that b u 1 is a Borel measurable function. Clearly, b u 2 is Borel measurable on X as well.
It is useful to notice that b
for every x 2 S. As a result, the function A 
. Then, it is not di¢ cult to see that for every " > 0, there exists (") 2 Rnf0g such that z + (") 2 [0; 1] and, for
Since b is a mixed strategy equilibrium of b G and, by construction, b U i ( ) U i ( ) for each i 2 f1; 2g and every 2 4(X), we conclude that b is also a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of
G.
Results similar to Theorem 7 can also be shown using Simon and Zame's (1990) endogeneous sharing rule approach, which was applied by Siegel (2009) to all-pay contests and by Klose and Kovenock (2013) to all-pay auctions with complete information and identity-dependent externalities.
Proof of Theorem 5
For a given > 0 and z 2 [0; 1], let e C (z) denote the set of all z We will show that every game on the unit square satisfying (i)-(iv) has a weakly reciprocally upper semicontinuous mixed extension. Consider a sequence of k = (
We have to show that there exist m 2 f1; 2g and
Since Let
Then there exist j 1 2 f1; 2g and a subsequence of k , denoted again by k , such that f
The reciprocal upper semicontinuity of G implies that f
.
Since all f j i ; i; j 2 f1; 2g; and u ijS ; i 2 f1; 2g, are uniformly continuous on their respective compact domains clS j and S, for every " > 0 there exists (") 2 (0;
and x 00 in clS j with kx 0 x 00 k < 2 (") and u ijS (x 0 ) u ijS (x 00 ) < " for all x 0 and x 00 in S with kx 0 x 00 k < 2 (").
It follows from the uniform payo¤ security of G that, for each s 2 f1; : : : ; Lg, there exists d i (z s ;
For each s 2 f1; : : : ; Lg, pick some e s 2 (0; (
We want to show that there exist d 1 i 2 X i and 1 2 (0; e 1 ] such that
. Consider …rst the case where
) and 1 = e 1 . Notice
Since
(X i n e C 1 (z 1 )), and the sequence f(
)g converges weakly to (b ij e C 1 (z 1 ) ; b i jX i n e C 1 (z 1 ) ), we have that
Therefore,
A further important fact is that u i (d
for every x i 2 e C 1 (z 1 ). To understand it, notice that for some z i 2 e C 1 (z 1 ),
which would not be necessarily true if y 1 were (0; 0) or (1; 1). Moreover,
, and
for every x i ; z i 2 e C 1 (z 1 ).
It follows from the de…nition of b i that for some subsequence of f k g,
) > b i , and, therefore,
and, therefore,
Consider the case where y 1 = (0; 0). If i = 1, then, since j 1 = 1 by virtue of (iii), put d
). In this case, it is clear that
for every x i 2 e C 1 (0). The rest of the argument is quite similar to that provided above. Let i = 2. If j 1 = 1, then the uniform payo¤ security condition for player 2's strategy 0 can be made use of. If j 1 = 2 and f 1 2 (0; 0) u 2 (0; 0), then, put d
). If j 1 = 2 and f 1 2 (0; 0) < u 2 (0; 0), then the uniform payo¤ security condition for player 2's strategy 0 can be made use of. The case where y 1 = (1; 1) can be handled in a similar manner. We will now describe how to pick, for each s 2 f2; : : : ; Lg, d s i 2 X i and s 2 (0; (
, then it is possible to make use of the uniform payo¤ security condition for player i's strategy z s . If y s is a point of discontinuity of
for some j 2 f1; 2g, then, to avoid ambiguity in notation, denote l = i = f1; 2gnfig, and put d 
. If this is not the case, then it is possible to choose a small enough s 2 (0; (
. This is so because, by choosing s close enough to 0, b (C 2 s (0; 0) \ S 1 ) can be made arbitrarily small, and, moreover, G is a compact game and
However, if such a subsequence of f k g exists, then one of the possible ways to circumvent the obstacle is to repeat the above argument for player 2 ( i = 2), with y 1 = (0; 0) and j 1 = 1. A similar problem can not occur in this case even if y s = (1; 1) for some s 2 by virtue of (iii).
, and, consequently, it is not di¢ cult to see that
, which implies that is weakly reciprocally upper semicontinuous.
The case where each b m has a countable number of mass points can be treated similarly because b 1 and b 2 are …nite measures and G is a compact game. For example, let the set of mass points of b lying on S, W (b ), be a countable set. Since U i jumps down at b along the sequence k , there are 
Proof of Theorem 6
For the sake of notational simplicity, denote X 1 h 1 and lim k U m ( k ), m = 1; 2, exist. We have to show that there exist m 2 f1; 2g
Since U i jumps down at b along the sequence k , it must be the case
Denote by W (b ) = fy 1 ; : : : ; y L g, the set of mass
and there exists some u i db > a > 0.
For some j 1 2 f2; 3g and some subsequence of k , denoted again by k , we have that f 
Consider …rst the case where i = 2. Since the details of the argument in this case is similar to those that can be found in the proof of Theorem 5, we will describe how to choose d Let y 1 = (1; 0). By virtue of (iii), u 2 (1; 0) f We now have to describe how to choose, for each s 2 f2; : : : ; Lg, a deviation strategy d s 2 2 X 2 and a small enough s > 0 such that U 2 (d
. It is also done in a schematic way. Assume, for example, that y s = (0; Thus, if, for some s 2 f1; : : : ; Lg, some j 1 2 f1; 2; 3g, and some subsequence of k , denoted again by k , the inequalities f 
